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Abstract 
Across the globe, we witness the rise of populist authoritarian leaders – overbearing in their 
narrative, aggressive in behavior and often exhibiting questionable moral character. Drawing on 
evolutionary theory of leadership emergence – dominance and prestige as dual routes to 
leadership - we provide a situational and psychological account for when and why dominant 
leaders are preferred over other respected and admired candidates. We test our hypothesis using 
three studies, encompassing over 140,000 participants, across 69 countries, and spanning the past 
2 decades. We find robust support for our hypotheses that under situational threat of economic 
uncertainty (e.g., poverty rate, housing vacancy rate, unemployment) people escalate their 
support for dominant leaders. Further, we find that this phenomenon is mediated by participants’ 
psychological sense of lack of personal control. Together, these results provide the first large-
scale, globally representative evidence for the structural and psychological antecedents that 
increase the preference for dominant leaders over their prestigious counterparts. 
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Significance Statement 
We examine why dominant-authoritarian leaders attract support despite the presence of other 
admired-respected candidates. Although evolutionary psychology supports both dominance and 
prestige as viable routes for attaining influential leadership positions, extant research lacks 
theoretical clarity for when dominant leaders are preferred. Across 4 large-scale studies, we 
provide robust evidence for how economic uncertainty affects individuals’ psychological 
feelings of lack of personal control, resulting in greater preference for dominant leaders. This 
research offers important theoretical advancements for why around the globe, authoritarian 
leaders from the US and Indian elections to the Brexit campaign continue to influence 
constituents over other admired-respected leaders.  
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/body 
From the recent Brexit vote in the UK (1), to the resurgence of nationalism in communist 
China (2), to the ascend of the authoritarian Narendra Modi in India (3) to the overwhelming 
support for Donald Trump in the US elections (4), we are witnessing a return of populist, 
authoritarian leaders, with rhetoric focused on nationalism and protectionism of its indigenous 
citizens. Despite the general notion and research findings that indicate such individuals are often 
narcissistic, aggressive, and guided by a vague moral compass (5), their popularity remains 
steadfast even in the presence of other respected and admired candidates. This paper investigates 
when and why dominant leaders, despite the multitude of negative attributes associated with 
them, are often revered by its citizens. 
 We contend that preference for a dominant leader increases with uncertainty and 
competitive threats in one’s environment. When faced with a milieu of uncertainty and the 
resulting psychological lack of control, individuals favor a dominant/authoritarian leader, whom 
they believe has the capability to brave unfavorable winds and increase their future chances of 
success. We draw upon relevant literatures in social psychology (6, 7), political psychology (8) 
and evolutionary psychology (9, 10) to develop our theoretical arguments.  
A key tenet of Hogg’s uncertainty theory is that individuals are motivated to reduce 
uncertainty – an aversive state – often perceived as a threat. Thus, when uncertainty implicates 
the self via group membership, those who identify more with their group are motivated to take 
extreme actions to overcome challenges in the environment. For instance, when faced with 
uncertainty, individuals support groups that are perceived as more agentic (11), capable of taking 
radical actions against others (12), and endorse leaders who are perceived as non-prototypical 
and action oriented (13), in hopes that such actions would lead to uncertainty reduction. 
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Similarly, Jost and colleagues (8) argued that support for right-wing authoritarianism , social 
dominance and political conservatism is based on a “matching process” whereby people support 
ideologies “that are most likely to satisfy their psychological needs and motives (such as needs 
for order, structure, and closure and the avoidance of uncertainty or threat)” (p.341).  
 Evolutionary psychology further illustrates that primates, including humans, organize 
around dominance hierarchies with an alpha leader perched at the top – a preference that is 
especially acute when the environment is uncertain, threatening or when there is contest among 
species or groups for resources (9, 10, 14–16). For instance, a study found that after removing 
central attributes of the faces of George Bush and John Kerry and transposing those to a neutral 
face, participants preferred Bush’s physiognomy – associated with greater masculinity – as their 
leader in times of war and Kerry’s physiognomy – comparatively low on masculinity – as their 
leader in times of peace (15). However, the most convincing studies are among animals, and 
those within the human population have relied on experimental manipulations and fictional 
scenarios to demonstrate this phenomenon. Furthermore, the phenomenon is demonstrated within 
a limited context relying on small samples (57 participants for the above study). Alternate to 
these studies, we test our hypotheses using objective macroeconomic indicators of economic 
uncertainty for a large representative global sample –140,595 participants from 69 countries, and 
draw on evolutionary origins of leadership, to provide a theoretically grounded and empirically 
robust explanation for why dominant leaders are preferred over their prestigious counterparts. 
Dominance and prestige have been demonstrated as two distinct routes to ascend the 
hierarchy in order to attain influential leadership positions within groups (17). A dominance 
strategy necessitates an individual to be more assertive, controlling, decisive and self-assured in 
achieving their goals. Individuals pursuing this strategy often coerce or induce psychological fear 
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among other group members to attain these goals and do not worry about the cost accrued to 
others while doing so. They are apt at forming political coalitions and swift with decisions that 
help them achieve their goals and maintain their positions in their group (18). In contrast, 
individuals pursuing a prestige strategy, attain better social ranking by serving as cultural 
informational role models to others. Such individuals are not only successful in their domains but 
actively display and share knowledge or skills that are valuable to other group members. In 
return they receive respect and admiration from other group members, helping them attain a 
higher social rank in the group (19). The prestige path to attaining an influential position in the 
group hierarchy is unique to humans; individuals help in disseminating important cultural 
knowledge that helps others to overcome evolutionary selection pressures and increase their 
adaptation capabilities (20). An empirical investigation by Cheng and colleagues (17), 
demonstrated that both dominance and prestige are viable and alternate strategies of attaining 
influential positions within a social hierarchy.  
We contend that when faced with uncertainty, individuals prefer a leader who is self-
assured and decisive in achieving her objectives. These are characteristics that people expect to 
find in a dominant and authoritarian leader, compared to one who although is respected and well 
admired, is less willing to be forceful in pursuing her goals and commonly perceived as lacking 
conviction in making tough calls2 (18, 23). Drawing on established work on environmental 
uncertainty and its implications on individual psychology (24–26), we contend that the 
uncertainty surrounding an economic downturn would result among its citizens a feeling of lack 
                                                            
2 A pilot study directly tested our key assumption that dominant leaders are perceived as more agentic than prestige 
based leaders. We employed 8 items form the Personal Attributes Questionnaire, one of the most common 
operationalized measurement for the construct of agency (21, 22). Participants first read a description of a dominant 
vs. prestige type leader, and then rated these leaders on their perceived agency. As expected, we found a significant 
difference in participants’ ratings, such that dominant leaders, as expected, were perceived as more agentic than 
prestige based leaders; t(99)=10.51, MDom=4.35 (.59), MPtg=3.43 (.68), d=1.45. 
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of personal control. Lack of personal control is a deeply undesirable state and people are 
motivated to restore it, via various compensatory strategies (27, 28). These compensatory 
strategies can be based on individuals’ own ability or agency to overcome lost control, or their 
reliance on external agencies, such as governments, gods or leaders, to influence the outcome 
and restore a sense of agency or control on their behalf (27, 29).  
For example, existing work has shown that lack of personal control increases belief in 
external entities that can specifically provide a sense of agency; for instance  greater belief in an 
interventionist God as opposed to a God that is just a creator or provides meaning (30, 31). 
Moreover, when such external agents are challenged, for instance in the presence of a group 
level threat or uncertainty, individuals engage in behaviors or cognitions that are meant to 
increase personal control or they shift their beliefs in support of a different external entity that 
can help them bolster their perceived agency. Thus, when faced with political instability, 
participants expressed greater belief in God, a different external agent (32). Collectively, these 
findings highlight both group and individual level threats play an important role in affecting 
individual’s sense of personal control. The two threats are often substitutable and function in a 
hydraulic fashion; threats to personal agency [external agents] increases support in external 
agents [increases exertion of personal control], or alternatively, shifting of support among 
different external entities, all with the impetus of gaining greater agency through compensatory 
strategies (32, 33). Along similar lines, Fritsche and colleagues (34, 35) have proposed a group 
based control restoration model wherein those who feel a lack of personal control due to threats 
in the environment, engage in ethnocentric behaviors, such as ingroup favoritism and outgroup 
derogation, in order to restore their sense of personal control. Moreover, echoing substitutability 
between group and personal threats, the authors argue that group level threats (e.g., lack of 
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ingroup homogeneity) leads to group members feeling a lack of personal control resulting in 
greater ethnocentric behaviors. Further, such behaviors are amplified for those who identify 
strongly with their ingroup.  
Based on the above theoretical and empirical evidence, we contend that motivated to 
reduce the aversive state of low personal control, individuals when plagued by collective 
uncertainty will seek a dominant leader as a compensatory strategy to restore their sense of 
personal control. A dominant leader, by virtue of being perceived as decisive, assertive, self-
assured, and determined to serve the interest of its members even at the cost to external members 
(16), are considered as more reliable in motivating individual members to take swift collective 
action in the face of uncertainty (23). Whereas, a prestigious leader is generally perceived as a 
generous and helpful individual, and hence reluctant to prioritize the interest  of its members at 
all costs and especially at cost to other individuals (16) and thus appears as less agentic or 
indecisive in making difficult decisions (18). Taken together, a dominant leader provides a far 
stronger assurance in difficult times compared to a prestigious counterpart and affords a greater 
sense of agency. In short, we argue that individuals will endorse a dominant leader as opposed to 
a prestige leader when faced with uncertainty as a compensatory response to restore their sense 
of control or personal agency.  
We test our hypothesis using three studies where we operationalize uncertainty using 
macroeconomic indices (i.e., poverty rate, housing vacancy rate and unemployment) and map 
that to people’s preference for leaders. Further, in Study 3 we demonstrate that preference for a 
dominant leader is explained by people’s lack of personal control over their livelihood when 
faced with the threat of economic uncertainty. In doing so, we highlight how the social 
environment shapes people’s cognitive processes and preferences, thus influencing their 
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decisions to seek out and elect more dominant leaders, as means to regain their sense of personal 
control. 
Results 
Study 1. In Study 1 we sampled a cross-section of US citizens using Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(AMT) representing 46 different states (N=750, 44.13% females, Mage=34.61 years, SD=10.52) 
and asked for their voting preference. On the day, but prior to the start of the third presidential 
debate of 2016, participants indicated their voting preference between Donald Trump, Hillary 
Clinton or neither. In a separate pretest, employing a different sample, and candidates as the 
between subject condition, we first asked participants to rate the two candidates – Donald Trump 
and Hillary Clinton – on a validated dominance-prestige scale (5) in comparison to each other. 
The scale consisted of 5 items measuring prestige (e.g., “Donald Trump/Hillary Clinton is a kind 
of leader who is respected and admired by other members”) (α=.96) and 6 items measuring 
dominance (e.g., “Donald Trump/Hillary Clinton is a kind of leader who often tries to get his/her 
own way regardless of what others may want”) (α=.96)3. It was found that participants 
considered Donald Trump to be significantly higher on dominance in comparison to Hillary 
Clinton (F(1,118)=6.95, p=.01, d=.48, M1=5.51, M2=4.71). However, for prestige we found the 
opposite, such that participants rated Donald Trump significantly lower on prestige in 
comparison to Hillary Clinton (F(1,118)=12.26, p=.001, d=.64, M1=3.54, M2=4.68). Therefore, if 
our hypothesis is to be supported, we should expect participants facing economic uncertainty to 
prefer Donald Trump as opposed to Hillary Clinton.  
After indicating their voting preference, participants reported their demographics and the 
zip code they live in. To rule out participants’ political ideology as an alternate explanation for 
                                                            
3 We use a shorter version of the original 17-item scale based on confirmatory factor analysis performed on an 
independent sample, using items that had a factor score greater than or equal to .60. 
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their voting preference, we measured their political orientation using a single item with higher 
values implying democratic/liberal orientation. We also controlled for participants’ reported 
income, gender, age and the number of months/years they have lived in their reported zip code. 
We collected macroeconomic data for each zip code using Economic Innovation Group’s (EIG) 
database - an independent group of economists and policymakers, interested in examining the 
economic markers of America’s fiscal health (36). The EIG dataset contains economic indicators 
for more than 25,000 zip codes covering 99 percent of America. We matched data from this 
database to the reported zip codes in our study to examine whether economic uncertainty predicts 
preference for a dominant, authoritarian leader over a respected and well admired leader. 
Economic uncertainty was operationalized by aggregating the three key economic indicators – 
unemployment, housing vacancy rate and poverty rate (α=.72) – that are regularly monitored by 
the US treasury department to make economic forecasts and assess development in a particular 
region (37). Higher values of this indicator represent greater economic uncertainty.  
We performed a multi logit regression with preference to vote for Hillary Clinton as the 
base option and examining participants’ choice to vote for Donald Trump or neither of the two in 
comparison to the base outcome. Results revealed that economic uncertainty predicted 
preference for Donald Trump over and above the control variables, which included a voter’s 
political partisanship (b=4.51, p=.021)4. Additionally, preferring not to vote for either of the two 
candidates was also significantly predicted by economic uncertainty (b=4.27, p=.008)5. Overall 
these results provide initial evidence that economic uncertainty increases preference for a 
dominant leader as opposed to a prestigious leader. 
                                                            
4 Regression and correlation tables are presented in the online supplementary materials. 
5 Results do not change if we drop participants who preferred not to vote for Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump.  
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Study 2. The objective of this study was to a) assess the reliability of our findings and more 
importantly, b) directly assess participants’ preference for a dominant or a prestige leader instead 
of the indirect evidence, as documented in Study 1. The design of this study was similar to Study 
1. We sampled a large cross-section of US citizens using AMT, representing 50 different states 
(N=1403, average of 28.1 participants per state, (range 1-121), 52.49% females, Mage=37.96 
years, SD=12.35) and asked them to report their preference for the leader they would like to see 
in power in their town or city. Participants rated their preference for a leader on the same 
dominance prestige scale items used in the pre-test of Study 1 (αPrestige=.89, αDominance=.90). 
Further, to ensure that above effects are not influenced by participants’ identification with their 
larger (more abstracted) physical surroundings (38), participants also rated their identification 
with the city or town their zip code is embedded in (α=.91) (39). As in Study 1, participants also 
reported income, gender, age and the number of months/years they have lived in their reported 
zip code. Participants’ reported zip code was matched to the EIG database and the same three 
variables (poverty rate, unemployment and housing vacancy rate) were used to operationalize 
economic uncertainty (α=.71). As participants were indicating their preference for their local 
leader, we also controlled for geographical size of the county participants lived in using a 
covariate - total number of zip codes in the county.  
A multilevel regression analysis with zip codes nested in each of the 50 states was 
performed. Regression results are presented in Table 1. When economic uncertainty in a 
particular zip code was included as the independent variable, a significant negative relationship 
with preference for a prestigious leader (b=-.87; p=.016; Model 2) was observed whereas a 
significant positive relationship in preferring a dominant leader emerged over and above the 
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various control variables (b=1.02; p=.035; Model 4)6. By measuring participants’ preferences 
using validated measures of dominance and prestige, we demonstrate that increased economic 
uncertainty differentially affects leadership preference, whereby dominant leaders are preferred 
significantly more and prestigious leaders significantly less. These results among a cross-section 
of US participants, presents yet further evidence of how economic insecurity influences people’s 
preference for a dominant authoritarian leader. 
Study 3. In Study 3, we wanted to examine the robustness of this phenomenon more broadly, as 
well as explore the underlying psychological mechanism driving this effect7. Specifically, we 
contend the threat that accompanies economic uncertainty will engender among individuals a 
feeling of lack of personal control - an undesirable state that can be restored by looking to others, 
such as a dominant leader, to help rectify.  
To test the above hypothesis, we collected data from two different databases – World 
Values Survey (WVS) and the World Development Indicators (WDI), a global macroeconomic 
dataset maintained by the World Bank (40). WVS is a popular database relied on by social 
scientists to understand changes in social and political beliefs of people across the world (41). 
They collect data on the same questions across approximately 100 countries representing roughly 
90% of the world population. WVS has been carried out in waves between 1981 and 2014, with 
collection cycles distributed almost evenly across the years. We examined the entire dataset that 
included all our variables of interest from 1994 with a final sample of 138,323 non repeat 
observations across 69 countries. We combined this data with WDI database containing yearly 
data of macroeconomic indicators. WDI contained poverty data for only 16 out of 69 countries, 
and housing vacancy rate was also not available, therefore we used change in unemployment, a 
                                                            
6 Correlation table is available in the online supplementary material. 
7 We also replicate the proposed psychological mechanism by experimentally manipulating personal control. See 
Study S1 in the online supplementary materials.  
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widely used variable by governments and scholars as a single lead indicator of economic health 
in a particular region (42–45), as the independent variable, with positive change in 
unemployment implying greater economic duress. 
We operationalized preference for dominant leader using a single item, asking 
participants their opinion of “having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament 
and elections” on a 4-point scale. We reverse coded the scale such that higher values imply 
greater preference for a dominant leader. This measure is a conservative test of our hypothesis as 
the above item describes willingness to place a leader at the helm that at times is willing to 
disregard constitutional procedures rather than elect a leader who might be dominant but would 
still operate within statutory boundaries. Lack of personal control was operationalized using a 
question that asked participants to rate how much control they have over their lives, on a scale of 
1 to 10. A similar measure has been used by others to operationalize lack of control (33). The 
scale was reverse coded such that higher values imply lack of personal control. We also 
controlled for participants’ subjective social class, the income group they fall into, political 
beliefs (liberal or conservative), gender and age in our analysis. 
Similar to Study 2, we ran a multilevel analysis as participants were nested within each 
country. We find that as unemployment increases, preference for a dominant leader also 
increases (b=.01; p<.001; Table 2, Model 4). We also find that rate of change in unemployment 
is positively associated with lack of control among participants (b=.10; p<.001; Table2, Model 
2). More importantly when both change in unemployment rate and lack of control are entered 
together in the regression equation, both variables predict preference for a dominant leader over 
and above the control variables (Table 2, Model 5). We tested for lack of control as a mediator 
by running the bootstrap procedure with 5000 iterations. The indirect effect of unemployment 
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rate via lack of control, on preferring a dominant leader, was positive and significant (b=.0002, 
p<.001) with bias corrected 95% CI not containing zero [.0001, .0004].  
To further establish that endorsing a dominant leader when faced with collective 
uncertainty is a compensatory strategy to restore a sense of personal control, we tested whether 
such effects were amplified for those who identified more strongly with their ingroup. In line 
with the group based control restoration model (34) and uncertainty-identity theory (6), our 
documented effects should be stronger for group members who identify more strongly with their 
ingroup. Accordingly, we operationalized social identity using a self-report item on the World 
Values Survey (WVS), that asks participants to report “how proud they are of their nationality” 
on a 5-point scale. As predicted, a first stage moderated mediation bootstrap analysis revealed 
that the effect of economic uncertainty via lack of personal control on endorsing a dominant 
leader was stronger for those who identified highly with their country (b=.0007, p<.001, 95%CI 
[.0005, .0009]) than those who identified less (b=.0003, p<.001, 95%CI [.0002, .0005]). Further, 
the difference in indirect effects for high and low level of identification was also significant 
(b=.0003, p<.001, 95%CI [.0002, .0005]). This analysis provides further evidence in support of 
our theoretical model. 
Overall, this study not only replicates findings from Studies 1 and 2, but also provides 
convincing evidence that economic uncertainty increases preference for a dominant leader 
because of participants’ lacking a sense of personal control over their livelihood. By testing our 
theory across a large global sample and across a long temporal window, Study 3 further increases 
our confidence in the robustness and the generalizability of our results.   
Discussion 
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Much ink has been spilled by political pundits proffering the appeal and success of the 
forceful leadership of Nigel Farage’s “take back control” Brexit call, and even greater ink 
continues to flow in providing a logical architecture for the wide appeal of the assertive 
leadership of Donald Trump. Alternate to these political, and personality laden insights, we set 
out to empirically examine, guided by evolutionary theory for leadership emergence, the recent 
spate of global appeal for dominant leaders. Our central assertion is that the psychological threat 
imposed by one’s environment, increases the appeal of an external agent who could help assuage 
this threat, and the psychological sense of lacking control over one’s life. Specifically, people 
prefer a leader who is perceived as decisive, authoritative and dominant in assuaging this threat, 
over a respected, knowledgeable, admired and permissive one. As hypothesized, across three 
studies, we find consistent, robust effect for individuals to prefer dominant over prestige leaders 
both locally (within towns and cities) and nationally (country level) when faced with the 
situational threat of economic uncertainty.  
In Study 1 and Study 2, utilizing a survey, and a large dataset measuring the economic 
health of 25,000 zip codes in the US, we find US participants faced with uncertainty stemming 
from increased economic struggle, show a preference for dominant leaders to hold power within 
their respective cities, towns and country and reject their respected and admired counterparts. 
Then employing a longitudinal dataset of over 138,000 participants, across 69 countries, 
spanning 20 years, and controlling for political partisanship, we again find evidence of the 
phenomenon; when faced with the threat of increased unemployment, participants increase their 
support nationally for dominant leaders. Finally, and in line with recent experimental research 
that demonstrates situational reduction in perceived control strengthens people’s resolve in 
powerful external agents (33), we find the psychological sense of lacking control, that naturally 
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results from the economic hardship of unemployment, mediates people’s preference for 
dominant leaders globally. Together, these results provide the first large-scale, globally 
representative, evidenced based support for the structural and psychological antecedents that 
increase preference for dominant over prestigious leaders.  
Finally, we expect the effect of uncertainty via lack of personal control in supporting a 
dominant leader to generalize beyond economic indicators to other uncertainties that challenge a 
group’s agency8 (for e.g. war, terrorism, etc.).  Crucially however, we only expect these results 
for epistemic uncertainty, and not for aleatory uncertainty (46, 47). Epistemic uncertainty is one 
that with some effort and due diligence can be known in advance and managed better whereas 
aleatory uncertainty comprises of random events (e.g., earthquakes) that cannot be anticipated 
and are thus beyond human control. Thus, our effects should extend to other group level threats 
that are perceived as more epistemic and thus threaten individual’s personal control, and less so 
to those aleatory in nature. This could be an important boundary condition to be examined in 
future research.  Finally, the partial mediation of personal control found in Study 3, leaves open 
the possibility of additional psychological mechanisms contributing to the effect, which warrants 
future research.   
In conclusion, this research beyond providing a theoretically grounded and evidence 
based insight to the psychological impetus for supporting the likes of Farage, Trump and Modi, 
the results hold important social implications. Specifically, the results highlight how economic 
indicators of the health of a nation, not only have direct impact on its citizens and their well-
being, but also shape their preference for those who hold office. Moreover, these leaders voted 
into power in turn set economic policies that shape the next generation’s well-being and 
preferences. 
                                                            
8 See Study S2 in the online supplementary materials. 
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Methods 
Study 1 
Participants. A total of 777 participants provided complete responses of which 9 participants 
completed the study more than once (duplicate IP address) and 17 indicated English as not their 
first language. Hence these 26 observations (3.53%) were not included in the final analysis and 
our final sample consisted of 750 participants (1 participant did not provide political orientation 
rating and hence was automatically excluded from the regression analysis). Results hold if we 
include participants who indicated English as not their first language. 
Study 2 
Participants. A total of 1441 participants provided complete responses of which 25 participants 
completed the study more than once (18 with duplicate IP address and 7 with duplicate MTurk 
ID) and 13 indicated English as not their first language. Hence these 38 observations (2.64%) 
were not included in the final analysis and the final sample consisted of 1403 participants. 
Results hold if we include participants who indicated English as not their first language. 
Data availability. The authors declare that all data supporting the findings, study protocols and 
stimulus materials are available publically at https://osf.io/5xez4/.  
Ethics Statement.  The ethics approval for this project was provided by London Business 
School as per the school’s guidelines. In line with ethical guidelines, all participants provided 
informed consent before taking the studies.  
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